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Since 1992, the UK Government has published so-called ‘school league tables’ summarising the
average General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) ‘attainment’ and ‘progress’ made by
pupils in each state-funded secondary school in England. While the headline measure of school
attainment has remained the percentage of pupils achieving five or more good GCSEs, the headline
measure of school progress has changed from ‘value-added’ (2002–2005) to ‘contextual value-
added’ (2006–2010) to ‘expected progress’ (2011–2015) to ‘progress 8’ (2016–). This paper charts
this evolution with a critical eye. First, we describe the headline measures of school progress. Second,
we question the Government’s justifications for scrapping contextual value-added. Third, we argue
that the current expected progress measure suffers from fundamental design flaws. Fourth, we exam-
ine the stability of school rankings across contextual value-added and expected progress. Fifth, we
discuss the extent to which progress 8 will address the weaknesses of expected progress. We conclude
that all these progress measures and school league tables more generally should be viewed with far
more scepticism and interpreted far more cautiously than they have often been to date.
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Introduction
In England, so-called ‘school league tables’ summarising the average educational per-
formances made by pupils in each state-funded secondary school have been published
annually since 1992 (DfE, 2016a). These tables, derived from pupils’ General Cer-
tificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) examination results, form a fundamental
component of the Government’s school accountability by results regime. The tables
have their origins in the 1980, 1988 and 1992 Education Reform Acts, which intro-
duced the national curriculum, high-stakes testing and market forces to the education
system. This legislation received support from a number of senior academics involved
with the Government’s Task Group on Assessment and Testing (TGAT) (Black,
1988). TGAT argued both for a national curriculum and the publication of ‘unad-
justed’ test and examination results school by school.
Schools’ performances in these tables inform the inspections carried out by the
Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted—the school inspectorate system). Schools
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judged underperforming face various sanctions, including increased scrutiny, poten-
tial takeover by neighbouring schools and even closure. The tables also play a role in
facilitating the quasi-market in education by informing parental school choice. This
policy context has been well documented (e.g. West & Pennell, 2000; West, 2010).
Our focus in this paper is on statistically critiquing the different headline measures of
school ‘attainment’ and ‘progress’ which have featured in these tables and played a
central role in holding schools to account over the last 25 years.
School attainment measures aim to report the average status of pupils at the end of
secondary schooling (year-group 11, age 15/16). The Government’s headline mea-
sure of school attainment has always been the percentage of pupils achieving five or
more GCSEs (or equivalent qualifications judged to be of a similar difficulty; DfE,
2015b) at grade A* to C (5 A*–C; the A* grade was introduced in 1994 to differenti-
ate between top and lower A grades), and since 2006, two of these GCSEs have had
to include English and mathematics. For those less familiar with the English educa-
tion system, see Section S1 of the supplementary materials where we provide an over-
view together with a summary table (Table S1) of the headline attainment and
progress measures. Nationally, 57% of pupils achieved 5 A*–C in 2014 (DfE,
2015c). Unfortunately, this measure is frequently misinterpreted as a measure of the
quality of schools. For example, if one school’s 5 A*–C percentage exceeds another
school’s percentage, that difference is all too often attributed solely to a supposed dif-
ference in the educational effectiveness of the two schools. However, such an inter-
pretation is invalid, as 5 A*–C confounds any true effect a school has with the
composition of each school’s intake: schools with higher-attaining pupils at intake will
tend to score higher at GCSE, irrespective of the effectiveness of schooling provided.
Such straightforward comparisons of average test or examination results are often
referred to as ‘unadjusted’, since no attempt has been made to allow or adjust for such
possible confounding effects. Another long-standing criticism of 5 A*–C is that it per-
versely incentivises schools to concentrate their efforts and resources on pupils at the
GCSE grade C/D borderline (West & Pennell, 2000; NAO, 2003; Wilson et al.,
2006; West, 2010). Other unintended consequences of the high-stakes nature of 5
A*–C include ‘teaching to the test’ at the expense of teaching a broader curriculum
(Goldstein, 2004), and the practice of entering pupils for ‘easier’ qualifications (Wil-
son et al., 2006) and examinations multiple times (Taylor, 2016). Concerns have also
been raised about increased anxiety and stress among schools and pupils, as well as
pressures on oversubscribed schools to ‘cream skim’ pupils who are likely to do well
on these tests and select out those likely to do poorly.
School progress measures aim to report the average growth made by pupils across all
five years of secondary schooling (ages 11 to 16). Progress measures are widely con-
sidered the fairer and more meaningful way to compare the effectiveness of schools,
for both school choice and accountability purposes, as they implicitly attempt to
adjust for what are often substantial differences in the composition of pupils’ prior
attainments and other characteristics between schools at intake. Our focus in this
paper is therefore on school progress measures for school accountability; see Leckie
and Goldstein (2009, 2011a) and Wilson and Piebalga (2008) for discussions of
issues specific to school choice. In contrast to the headline measure of school attain-
ment, the headline measure of school progress has changed multiple times: from
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‘value-added’ (2002–2005) to ‘contextual value-added’ (2006–2010) to ‘expected
progress’ (2011–2015) to ‘progress 8’ (2016–).
The aim of this paper is to explore this evolution of school progress measures with
a critical eye. First, we describe the headline measures of school progress. Second, we
question the Government’s justifications for scrapping contextual value-added
(CVA). Third, we argue that the current expected progress (EP) measure suffers from
fundamental design flaws. Fourth, we examine the stability of school rankings across
CVA and EP. Fifth, we discuss the extent to which progress 8 (P8) will address the
weaknesses of EP.
Headlinemeasures of school progress
In 2002 the Government introduced ‘national median line’ ‘value-added’ (VA1).
VA1 measured how much better (or worse) each school performed in the GCSE
examinations than predicted by their pupils’ attainments at intake. Specifically,
schools’ scores were derived as simple school averages of the difference between each
pupil’s GCSE score in their ‘best eight’ GCSE and equivalent qualifications and the
median score achieved nationally by pupils with the same prior attainment as mea-
sured in the end of primary schooling Key Stage 2 (KS2) tests (year-group 6, age
10/11). VA1 was criticised for failing to account for school differences in pupil socioe-
conomic and demographic characteristics, which had been shown to predict GCSE
scores even after adjusting for prior attainment (NAO, 2003; Ray et al., 2009). As
such, VA1 was argued, like 5 A*–C, to be biased in favour of schools with more
socially advantaged intakes. VA1 was also criticised for failing to communicate the
statistical uncertainty surrounding what were in effect the Government’s first
attempts to estimate the underlying quality or effectiveness of individual institutions.
In 2006 the Government replaced VA1 with CVA, and this measure ran until
2010. CVA attempted to better separate schools’ ‘true’ effects from the composition
of their intakes. Conceptually, CVA scores were still school-level averages of the dif-
ference between pupils’ actual and predicted GCSE scores, but now pupils’ predicted
scores were calculated as a flexible function of not only their KS2 test scores when
they started secondary schooling, but also their age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic
status [as proxied by free school meal (FSM) eligibility] and various other pupil and
school characteristics. These calculations were achieved via fitting a simple multilevel
model to the data (Goldstein, 2011) (see Section S2 in the supplementary materials
for technical details). The scores were also presented with 95% confidence intervals
to communicate the imprecision with which they were estimated.
In 2011 the Government scrapped CVA citing, among other reasons, that it was
difficult for the public to understand and that by adjusting for school differences in
pupils’ socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds, CVA entrenched low educa-
tional aspirations in disadvantaged pupil groups (DfE, 2010d). These justifications
have gone largely unchallenged in the academic literature. In its place, the Govern-
ment introduced two new measures of school progress. The first measure, referred to
as simply ‘value-added’ (VA2), simplified the CVA measure by basing pupils’ pre-
dicted GCSE scores solely on their KS2 scores. Conceptually it was therefore a return
to the simplicity of VA1. However, it is the second of the two new progress measures,
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EP, which has in effect become the Government’s headline measure of progress since
2011.
EP, in contrast to CVA, is not a value-added-based approach. The measure, which
is reported separately for English language and mathematics, is calculated as the per-
centage of pupils in each school who ‘make the progress expected of them’ during sec-
ondary schooling, defined for all pupils as three (or more) national curriculum levels
(see Section S1 in the supplementary materials for background information on
national curriculum levels). Thus, for example, pupils achieving level 4 in their Eng-
lish KS2 tests (i.e. middle prior attainers) are expected to progress three national cur-
riculum levels to grade C (or higher) in that subject at GCSE; meanwhile pupils
achieving level 5 (i.e. high prior attainers) are expected to progress to grade B (or
higher). Importantly, the measure does not take into account school differences in
pupils’ socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds. The measure is also published
without confidence intervals. Nationally, 72% of pupils made EP in English in 2014,
while 66%made EP in mathematics (DfE, 2015c).
EP also plays a central balancing role in the current minimum levels of perfor-
mance, or ‘floor standards’, by which the Government judges schools to be ‘under-
performing’ (DfE, 2010d). A school is judged underperforming if less than 40% of
pupils achieve 5 A*–C; however, schools are exempted if their EP scores exceed the
national median values in both English and mathematics. Schools judged underper-
forming face increased scrutiny from Ofsted, potential takeover by neighbouring
schools (especially so-called ‘academy sponsors’—chains of schools run by charitable
or commercial organisations outside the control of their local authorities; HoCL,
2015) and even closure. Nationally, 330 schools (11% of all schools) were judged
underperforming in 2014 (DfE, 2015c).
Recently, several education commentators have drawn attention to perceived pecu-
liarities of EP, noting in particular that EP appears biased in favour of high prior
attainers (Bostock, 2014; Dracup, 2015; Stewart, 2015). However, we are not aware
of any formal studies which examine this and related statistical issues surrounding
EP.
Looking to the future, in 2016 the Government is implementing a new school
accountability system including new floor standards (DfE, 2016c). As part of this
they will scrap EP and introduce a new headline progress measure, P8. P8 marks
a return to a value-added-based approach. P8 will be defined in terms of a new
measure of GCSE attainment, ‘attainment 8’ (A8), defined as a pupil’s total point
score measured across GCSE English and mathematics and six further subjects.
The list of approved subjects (DfE, 2016c) is stricter (more academic) than those
allowed under 5 A*–C and CVA (and VA1 and VA2). Schools’ P8 scores are then
simple averages of the differences between pupils’ A8 scores and the national aver-
age A8 scores of pupils with the same prior attainment. Like EP (and VA1 and
VA2), but in contrast to CVA, P8 will make no adjustments for pupil socioeco-
nomic or demographic characteristics. In contrast to EP (and VA1) it will, how-
ever, report statistical uncertainty via 95% confidence intervals. P8 will also
replace EP in the Government’s floor standards. A school will now be judged
underperforming if its pupils score on average half a grade lower than predicted
and if this difference is statistically significant.
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Why was CVA scrapped?
The Government’s 2010 Schools White Paper lays out its reasons for withdrawing
CVA (DfE, 2010d, p. 68):
We will put an end to the current ‘contextual value added’ (CVA) measure. This measure
attempts to quantify how well a school does with its pupil population compared to pupils
with similar characteristics nationally. However, the measure is difficult for the public to
understand, and recent research shows it to be a less strong predictor of success than raw
attainment measures. It also has the effect of expecting different levels of progress from
different groups of pupils on the basis of their ethnic background, or family circumstances,
which we think is wrong in principle.
In this section we examine these three justifications in turn.
Hard to understand
There is certainly merit in their first justification, namely that CVA was hard for the
public to understand. After all, CVA scores were derived from a statistical model
which included a large set of covariates and their interactions. However, there was no
requirement to understand the technical details of the model in order to interpret the
CVA scores, only the general principle of adjusting schools’ GCSE examination
results for differences in prior attainment and related factors between schools at the
start of secondary schooling. Perhaps the real problem was in the way CVA was pre-
sented to the public. Table 1, which focuses for simplicity on a single local authority,
Bristol, reports CVA scores as well as various other performance measures for schools
in 2010, the last year CVA was published. CVA scores measured schools’ perfor-
mances relative to the national average (standardised to have a score of 1000) and
therefore had no immediate absolute interpretation; a school’s score for one year was
not directly comparable with their score the year before. More fundamentally, it was
not clear to the public what the CVA unit of measurement was; one had to delve deep
into the technical documentation (DfE, 2010c) to find out (a 6-point increase in
CVA corresponded to pupils, on average, achieving one grade higher in their best
eight GCSEs). The CVA 95% confidence intervals were also largely ignored by the
media, and no doubt by the public more generally (Leckie & Goldstein, 2011b). In
terms of the latter, the Government might have had more success had it tried to com-
municate the statistical uncertainty in CVA visually rather than in tabular form, as
discussed recently by Leckie et al. (2016).
It is interesting to note that the Government has somewhat undermined its ‘hard to
understand’ argument by continuing to apply the methodology which underlay CVA
in the VA2 (2011–2015) measure (which only adjusts for prior attainment) (DfE,
2011), although VA2 admittedly has a much lower public profile than CVA ever did.
It is also worth noting that the methodology which underlay CVA is effectively the
same as that used for Hong Kong’s public school performance tables today (SVAIS,
2015). It is also simpler than that underlying many other school performance
measures published around the world, such as the Tennessee value-added assessment
system (TVAAS, 2015).
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A poor predictor of success
It is less clear what the Government means by its second justification: ‘recent research
shows [CVA] to be a less strong predictor of success than raw attainment measures’.
Unfortunately, it does not cite the research referred to. One possible interpretation is
that a school’s average GCSE performance (‘success’) is more strongly predicted by
their pupils’ average KS2 performance (‘raw attainment measures’) than by their
school’s CVA score. While this may well be the case, such a result does not in itself
mean that CVA is a poor measure of school effectiveness. Indeed, it would more be a
reflection of the relatively small influence that schools have on pupil progress (Ras-
bash et al., 2010) versus the substantial influence of school differences in the compo-
sition of pupil prior attainment.
Expected different progress from different pupil groups
The Government’s third justification states that ‘[CVA] also has the effect of expect-
ing different levels of progress from different groups of pupils on the basis of their
Table 1. City of Bristol school league table
School n 5 A*–C CVA
CVA
lower
CVA
upper
EP
English
EP
maths
Ashton Park School 180 49 1003 994 1013 66 70
Bedminster Down School 191 40 989 979 998 74 48
Bridge Learning Campus—
Secondary
145 34 1003 993 1014 64 44
Brislington Enterprise College 216 37 970 962 979 60 40
Bristol Brunel Academy 158 45 1005 994 1016 69 62
Bristol Cathedral Choir School 75 75 1002 987 1017 95 77
Bristol Metropolitan Academy 127 39 1011 999 1023 76 61
The City Academy Bristol 183 36 1036 1027 1046 71 49
Colston’s Girls’ School 68 91 1010 992 1027 100 90
Cotham School 180 77 1016 1006 1026 86 85
Fairfield High School 194 49 1004 994 1014 73 63
Henbury School 161 39 1001 991 1011 66 54
Merchants’ Academy 124 25 1010 998 1021 56 26
Oasis Academy Brightstowe 93 29 1028 1015 1041 62 37
Oasis Academy Bristol 115 29 1007 995 1019 56 36
Orchard School 172 37 1005 995 1015 69 51
St Bede’s Catholic College 185 72 1006 996 1016 80 71
St Bernadette Catholic
Secondary School
152 37 980 969 990 66 47
St Mary Redcliffe and Temple
School
207 70 1013 1004 1022 86 75
Notes: n = number of pupils at the end of GCSE; 5 A*–C = percentage of pupils with five or more GCSEs (or
equivalent qualifications) at grade A* to C; CVA = contextual value-added score (national average = 1000);
CVA lower = lower limit of CVA 95% confidence interval; CVA upper = upper limit of CVA 95% confidence
interval; EP English = percentage of pupils making expected progress in English; EP maths = percentage of
pupils making expected progress in mathematics. Source: Table reproduced from www.education.gov.uk/
schools/performance/archive/schools_10/pdf_10/801.pdf.
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ethnic background, or family circumstances. . .’ However, CVA did not a priori expect
different levels of progress from different pupil groups, rather it adjusted for such dif-
ferences if they arose. In reality, nationally some pupil groups do make less progress
than others and this must be adjusted for if we are to make fair comparisons between
schools, as otherwise we penalise schools with a disproportionately high number of
pupils in these groups. For example, the 2010 CVA model results (DfE, 2010b) show
that male pupils, older pupils, pupils with FSM eligibility, pupils in care, pupils with
a special educational needs (SEN) statement, mobile pupils and pupils living in
deprived neighbourhoods all make less progress than their otherwise equal peers.
Pupils who speak English as an additional language and all ethnic minority groups
make more progress than White British pupils with the exception of White Irish trav-
ellers and White Gypsy/Roman pupils. By adjusting for ethnic background and family
circumstances, CVA for the first time rewarded schools for their efforts with harder to
teach pupil groups.
The Government expand on its third justification as follows (DfE, 2010d, p. 68):
It is morally wrong to have an attainment measure which entrenches low aspirations for
children because of their background. For example, we do not think it right to expect
pupils eligible for free school meals to make less progress from the same starting point as
pupils who are not eligible for free school meals (particularly once the introduction of the
Pupil Premium ensures that schools receive extra resources for pupils from poorer back-
grounds). We should expect every child to succeed and measure schools on how much
value they add for all pupils, not rank them on the make-up of their intake.
The Government is arguing that by adjusting for pupil background characteristics,
CVA led to a system-level acceptance that socially and other disadvantaged pupil
groups will make less progress than their more advantaged peers. In other words, it
argues that CVA contributed to the lower aspirations and expectations that some
schools and teachers hold for their working-class pupils relative to their more advan-
taged peers.
One mechanism through which this is likely to have occurred is some schools start-
ing to use the published CVA model to set differential GCSE targets for future
cohorts of pupils with different socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, even
when they had the same prior attainment. Indeed, the DfE gives the following warn-
ing, highlighted in red, on the first worksheet of their 2010 CVA ‘ready reckoner’
(DfE, 2010b):
. . . because some existing patterns should not become entrenched (for example boys tend-
ing to perform less well than girls), this workbook should not be used to determine what
students might achieve in the future or in different circumstances.
It goes on to state, in the supporting technical guide: ‘CVA should not be used to set
lower expectations for any pupil or group of pupils’ (DfE, 2010a). However, the CVA
model was never intended for this purpose, and that it might have been used in this
way reflects the perverse incentives and negative side-effects which so often arise in
high-stakes school accountability systems. Whether CVA did entrench low aspira-
tions for poor pupils via this or some other mechanism is not possible to answer using
the data at hand. What is known is that the DfE’s view is not universally held. In
2013, Brian Lightman, the then General Secretary of the Association of School and
School league tables in England 199
© 2017 The Authors. British Educational Research Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Educational
Research Association.
College Leaders (ASCL; the ASCL is a teaching union for secondary school leaders
which works to shape national education policy) said the ‘ASCL never believed that
CVA lowered expectations’ (TES, 2013).
Finally, the statement that ‘[CVA ranks pupils] on the make-up of their intake’
suggests a fundamental misunderstanding. CVA explicitly adjusted for as many
of the observed differences between schools’ intakes as possible, in order to
remove their influence from schools’ rankings. In contrast, it is when one ignores
these differences that one implicitly ranks schools on the make-up of their intake.
The aim of CVA is to adjust as fully as possible for all factors for which mea-
surements are available, driving schools’ results which can be considered beyond
the control of the school, the most important of which are school differences in
student composition. To accept this argument in the case of prior attainment, as
the Government clearly does, but not for other background characteristics sug-
gests a misunderstanding of the nature of a measure that is to be used as an
accountability instrument.
Statistical flaws with EP
The Government’s introduction of EP can be seen as an explicit attempt to address
the perceived flaws in CVA by providing a school progress measure which is both
easier for the public to understand and which is blind to all differences between
schools’ intakes other than prior attainment. EP, however, suffers from a number of
its own fundamental design flaws. In this section we explain and illustrate these flaws
using the 2014 school league table data. These data report the EP scores for 3033
mainstream secondary schools whose pupils sat their GCSE examinations in 2014
and their KS2 tests in 2009. To these school-level data we merge the underlying data
on pupils’ individual EP and KS2 scores from the national pupil database (NPD), the
data from which the school league tables are derived (DfE, 2016b).
Borderline effects
EP perversely incentivises schools to concentrate their efforts on pupils who are bor-
derline in terms of making EP. This can be seen by considering Table 2, which shows
the GCSE target grade associated with each KS2 level. At the pupil level, EP is a bin-
ary measure of progress. Pupils either make their target grade or they do not. There is
no middle ground. There is no partial reward for pupils who just miss their target
grades, nor any additional reward for pupils who surpass their target grades. The net
result is that schools are incentivised to focus their efforts on the subset of pupils at
the cusp of making three levels of progress. There is no incentive to work with pupils
who are unlikely to make this much progress or to stretch pupils beyond this.
This criticism is essentially the same as that long levelled at 5 A*–C, where schools
are known to concentrate resources on C/D borderline pupils. It is therefore unfortu-
nate that EP, developed some 20 years after the introduction of 5 A*–C, should suffer
from essentially the same design flaw. Golden et al. (2002) and Wilson et al. (2006)
show that schools engage in a wide range of strategies to support C/D borderline
pupils and, given the high-stakes nature of EP, it seems likely that similar strategies
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are being used for EP borderline pupils. These include assigning borderline pupils to
separate classes, mentoring, homework clubs and Saturday revision classes.
Biased in favour of high prior attainers
EP is severely biased in favour of schools with high prior attaining intakes. Figure 1
illustrates this by presenting the national percentage of pupils making EP in English
and mathematics in 2014 separately by KS2 level. We restrict the figure to pupils per-
forming at level 3, 4 or 5 (over 95% of all pupils). The percentage of pupils making
EP increases substantially with KS2 level, especially in mathematics, suggesting that
Table 2. Table showing how expected progress in English and mathematics is calculated
KS2 level
GCSE target grade/level
? U G F E D C B A A*
? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
? No No ? ? ? ? ? Yes Yes Yes
W No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1 No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: W = working towards level 1; ? = no result; No = EP not made; Yes = EPmade.
Source: Table reproduced from DfE (2015a).
Figure 1. National percentage of pupils making expected progress during secondary schooling
against KS2 levels (3, 4 and 5) in 2014, reported separately for English and mathematics.
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it is harder for low prior attainers to make three levels of progress than it is for high
prior attainers. One reason why low prior attainers struggle more to achieve their tar-
get grades might be that they receive lower levels of support than their higher prior
attaining peers, but we cannot assess the plausibility of this or other potential explana-
tions from the data at hand.
In terms of school league tables, the implication is that schools’ EP scores will very
much be driven by their mean intake attainment. Thus, EP, in contrast to CVA, is
not a pure progress measure of school performance, but neither is it a pure attainment
measure such as 5 A*–C. EP in effect penalises schools with low prior attaining
intakes and rewards those with high prior attaining intakes. It follows that, as with 5
A*–C, schools are perversely incentivised to select and subsequently concentrate their
efforts on high prior attainers at the expense of their lower prior attaining peers, since
the former require less resources to make their target grades (West & Pennell, 2000).
To what extent schools have been influenced by these incentives is hard to say, but
their existence at all is cause for concern.
Might this ‘design flaw’ have been in some sense intentional? After all, an argu-
ment could be made that EP deliberately sets especially aspirational expectations
for low prior attaining pupils vis-a-vis their high prior attaining peers in order to
bring about a system-wide narrowing of the attainment distribution. However, if
this were the case one might expect a more realistic, tailored and achievable set-
ting of aspirational target grades for low prior attainers than that implied by the
edict that all pupils should make three levels of progress irrespective of their start-
ing attainment. It is helpful at this point to view EP from the perspective of a
‘categorical’, ‘transition’ or ‘transition matrix’ model of attainment growth (Castel-
lano & Ho, 2013). In the small literature on this class of model, Table 2 is then
referred to as a ‘value table’, and the associated school performance measure is
calculated as the average transition value across the pupils in each school (Hill
et al., 2006). In the current case, the transition values are binary (0 = EP not
made; 1 = EP made). However, it is perfectly possible and preferable to assign a
range of transition values in order to far more intelligently incentivise schools to
concentrate their efforts on pupils at particular points in the prior attainment dis-
tribution. This would involve policymakers, ideally in conjunction with a wider
panel of experts and stakeholders, first making careful value judgements as to the
relative merit of each possible transition and then increasing or decreasing the
transition values to communicate to schools where they should concentrate their
resources (Hill et al., 2006).
While Figure 1 suggests that the probability of making EP increases monotonically
with prior attainment, Figure 2 shows the true relationship to be more complex. Fig-
ure 2 presents a bar chart of the national percentage of pupils making EP against KS2
sub-levels, plotted separately for English and mathematics. There are three KS2
sub-levels within each KS2 level, and so KS2 sub-levels provide a more finely graded
measure of prior attainment than KS2 levels. (See Section S1 in the supplementary
materials for further details and Figure S1 for an equivalent plot in terms of pupils’
underlying KS2 scores.) The figure reveals a sawtooth (zigzag) relationship between
EP and prior attainment, whereby the national percentage of pupils making EP no
longer increases monotonically with prior attainment as it did in Figure 1, but now
202 G. Leckie and H. Goldstein
© 2017 The Authors. British Educational Research Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Educational
Research Association.
drops dramatically as we move from the top of each KS2 level to the bottom of the
next. Figure 2 shows, for example, that while 72% of pupils at KS2 sub-level 3A
make EP in English, only 54% of pupils at KS2 sub-level 4C do so. The cause of this
discontinuity is that while the KS2 sub-level 3A pupils are set a grade D GCSE target,
the KS2 sub-level 4C pupils are set a tougher grade C GCSE target (see Table 2).
We see a corresponding discontinuity between KS2 sub-level 4A and sub-level 5C,
the point at which the GCSE target grade is raised from a C to a B, respectively.
Thus, at the thresholds between KS2 levels, EP results in pupils with effectively iden-
tical prior attainment being set different target grades.
In terms of the dramatic increase in the percentage of pupils making EP with
respect to KS2 score within each KS2 level, this is less surprising when one realises
that the small number of KS2 levels necessitates a very large number of pupils and
consequently a very wide range of prior attainment within each level. Indeed, half of
all pupils achieve KS2 level 4 in English and mathematics (53% and 46%, respec-
tively). Thus, even within each KS2 level, schools are perversely incentivised to con-
centrate their efforts on their higher prior attaining pupils.
However, perhaps the starkest result of all is in mathematics, where 96% of pupils
at KS2 sub-level 5A make expected progress, while the corresponding figure for
pupils at KS2 sub-level 3C is just 20%. Clearly, setting the same target of three levels
of progress for all pupils makes very little sense. In Figures S2 and S3 in the supple-
mentary materials we plot the actual average number of levels of progress made
nationally against KS2 levels and sub-levels, respectively. These figures reveal that
average progress differs massively by starting attainment. Taking the same example as
before, pupils at KS2 sub-level 3C in mathematics make, on average, only 1.1 levels
of progress during secondary schooling, while pupils at KS2 sub-level 5A make, on
average, 4.2 levels of progress.
Figure 2. National percentage of pupils making expected progress during secondary schooling
against KS2 sub-levels in 2014, reported separately for English and mathematics.
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Other pupil characteristics
EP takes no account of pupils’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. In
this sense EP does not expect a priori that disadvantaged pupils will make less pro-
gress than their more advantaged peers. However, as we have already argued, the real-
ity is that they do, and markedly so. Thus, for any given level of prior attainment, EP
will be biased in favour of schools which serve more advantaged pupil groups.
Statistical uncertainty
EP makes no attempt to quantify and communicate the statistical uncertainty in mea-
suring school progress. A simple example illustrates the severity of the problem. Con-
sider a school with 180 pupils, where 70% make EP. (Such a school corresponds to
the national average school, both in terms of school size and EP.) The associated
95% Wald binomial confidence interval ranges from 63% to 77%, and so the school
has a 7 percentage point margin of error. It is interesting to note that a margin of
error of this magnitude would be completely unacceptable in any survey or poll of
public opinion (YouGov, 2011), but in the current context this uncertainty is com-
pletely ignored; the Government publishes no confidence intervals or margins of error
for EP. There is therefore no obvious way for users to establish whether measured dif-
ferences between schools, or differences from national averages and floor standards,
are meaningful differences, or whether they more likely reflect chance variation. Users
are implicitly encouraged to view EP scores as error-free, potentially damaging the
quality of decision making (Goldstein & Spiegelhalter, 1996; Leckie & Goldstein,
2011b). Figure 3 reveals just how serious a design flaw this is by plotting schools’ EP
Figure 3. Expected progress scores in 2014 with 95%Wald binomial confidence intervals
presented in rank order of magnitude, reported separately for English and mathematics. Higher
ranks denote higher performances. The horizontal lines denote the national average EP scores. The
confidence intervals are approximate, hence their upper bounds exceeding a value of 100 for a
minority of schools with exceptionally high EP scores. For clarity, the plot shows every 20th school.
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scores with 95% Wald binomial confidence intervals against their school league table
ranking on this measure for all schools in the country. The horizontal lines denote the
2014 national average EP scores of 72% and 66% for English and mathematics,
respectively. The figure shows that over a third of schools (38% in English and 36%
in mathematics) cannot be statistically distinguished from the national average. Thus,
the EP measures are very noisy summary statistics of school progress and to avoid
misleading users, this uncertainty must be communicated.
Does choice of school progress measuremake a difference in practice?
We have explained how CVA and EP are fundamentally different measures of school
progress, both in terms of how they are calculated and in the interpretations they
afford. However, if the two measures are highly correlated and lead to similar rank-
ings, then the points we have made could be argued to be largely academic. In this
section we therefore show that this is not the case by analysing the 2010 school league
table data, the last year for which both CVA and EP appeared concurrently. The data
report the CVA and EP scores for 3056 mainstream secondary schools whose pupils
sat their GCSE examinations in 2010 and their KS2 tests in 2005.
Correlations between different school progress measures
Table 3 presents Pearson (and Spearman rank) correlations between CVA and EP in
English and mathematics in 2010. The table also includes correlations between these
progress measures and the Government’s headline attainment measure 5 A*–C as
well as schools’ mean KS2 attainment (averaging across English and mathematics).
The correlations between EP and CVA for English and mathematics are low at 0.36
and 0.29, respectively and so ranking schools on the basis of CVA and EP does lead
to very different results. Many schools which are ranked high on EP are ranked low
on CVA and vice versa. (This is starkly illustrated in Figure S4 in the supplementary
materials, a scatterplot of schools’ CVA ranks against their EP ranks.) Thus, the addi-
tional adjustments that CVA makes for school differences in pupil prior attainment
(and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics) over those made by EP are
substantial and lead to very different rankings. This is supported by the correlation of
just 0.02 between the CVA and KS2 average point score (APS) compared to corre-
lations of 0.64 and 0.67 between EP in English and mathematics and KS2 APS,
respectively. EP very clearly inadequately adjusts for school differences in intake
attainment. In fact, the prior attainment adjustments that the EP measures make are
so slight that EP in both English and mathematics is much more strongly correlated
with 5 A*–C than CVA, showing correlations of 0.85 and 0.89 for the two subjects,
respectively. Thus, EP appears much closer to being a pure attainment measure of
school performance than a pure progressmeasure.
The relationship between school progress measures and school mean prior attainment
To investigate further, Figure 4 plots the difference in national ranking between CVA
and EP in 2010 against schools’ mean KS2 scores. Schools with positive rank
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differences do better under CVA than under EP and vice versa. The figure shows a
strong negative association in each subject, consistent with EP being strongly biased
in favour of schools with high prior attaining intakes. We note that the schools with
the highest prior attaining intakes, and therefore benefitting most from the design
flaws of EP, are ‘grammar’ schools which set academic entrance exams and therefore
select on prior attainment. As well as recruiting the highest prior attaining intakes, we
note that grammar schools admit very few FSM and SEN pupils relative to the aver-
age school (HoCL, 2016a,b). Within grammar school areas, so-called ‘secondary
modern’ schools take the remaining pupils and therefore tend to have the lowest prior
attaining intakes. Thus, secondary modern schools appear most disadvantaged by
EP.
Table 3. Pearson (below the main diagonal of 1s) and Spearman rank (above the main diagonal
of 1s) correlation matrices for 5 A*–C, CVA, and EP in English and mathematics in 2010
5 A*–C CVA EP English EP maths KS2 APS
5 A*–C 1 0.25 0.84 0.88 0.84
CVA 0.24 1 0.37 0.29 0.02
EP English 0.85 0.36 1 0.75 0.61
EP maths 0.89 0.29 0.77 1 0.64
KS2 APS 0.87 0.02 0.64 0.67 1
Notes: Number of schools = 3056. 5 A*–C = percentage of pupils with five or more GCSEs (or equivalent qual-
ifications) at grade A* to C; CVA = contextual value-added score; EP English = percentage of pupils making
expected progress in English; EP maths = percentage of pupils making expected progress in mathematics; KS2
APS = KS2 average point score.
Figure 4. Difference between school CVA and EP ranks against school mean KS2 APS, based on
2010 school league table data, reported separately for English and mathematics. KS2 levels map
onto the KS2 point score scale as follows: [18,24] = KS2 level 3 (i.e. low prior attainers);
[24,30] = KS2 level 4 (i.e. middle prior attainers); [30,36] = KS2 level 5 (i.e. high prior attainers).
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The impact of choice of school progress measure on floor standards
Recall that the Government judges schools to be ‘underperforming’ if less than 40%
of their pupils achieve 5 A*–C but spares schools if, despite this, they exceed the
national median in EP in both English and mathematics (DfE, 2015c). Given that
just 501 schools (16%) achieved less than 40% 5 A*–C in 2010, one would not expect
many of these schools to appear in the top half of schools nationally in EP in English
and mathematics. The Government’s definition of ‘underperforming’ is clearly over-
whelmingly driven by low attainment on 5 A*–C, and even then the purported ‘bal-
ancing role’ played by the EP measures is undermined by these measures being closer
to pure attainment measures than pure progress measures. Indeed, only 37 schools
are excused by the high ‘progress’ they make with their pupils. Another way to com-
pare EP to CVA is therefore to see to what extent these ‘underperforming’ judge-
ments might be affected were we to excuse schools if they exceed the national median
in CVA rather than the national median in EP in both English and mathematics.
Whereas we find that 464 schools (15%) are ‘underperforming’ according to the
Government’s definition, a substantially lower 313 schools (10%) would be judged
underperforming if CVA were used in place of the EP measures. This sizeable reduc-
tion in the number of ‘underperforming’ schools illustrates the far greater balancing
role that CVA, a pure progress measure, would have had in contextualising schools’
low attainments compared to EP.
Looking ahead to the P8measure of progress
The forthcoming introduction of P8 into the 2016 school league tables marks a return
to a value-added-based approach to measuring school progress. In doing so, P8 will
avoid the borderline effects of EP whereby schools are incentivised to focus their
efforts on the subset of pupils at the cusp of making three levels of progress (Table 2).
P8 should also avoid the systematic bias in favour of high prior attainers (Figure 1)
and the illogical sawtooth relationship between progress and prior attainment (Fig-
ure 2) exhibited so strongly by EP. P8, in contrast to EP, will be reported with 95%
confidence intervals and therefore once again the Government will attempt to com-
municate the uncertainty in estimating school progress to end users (Figure 3). We
note that CVA equally avoided these three design flaws of EP. However, here the sim-
ilarity between P8 and CVA ends. P8, in contrast to CVA, will continue to make no
adjustment for pupils’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Presumably
this is a continuation of the Government’s argument used to justify the withdrawal of
CVA, namely that to adjust for such factors would have ‘. . . the effect of expecting dif-
ferent levels of progress from different groups of pupils on the basis of their ethnic
background, or family circumstances . . .’ (DfE, 2010d, p. 68). However, as argued
above, the choice to adjust or not for such factors is not so simple. Most importantly,
by failing to adjust for differences in schools’ intakes, P8 will continue to penalise
schools serving educationally disadvantaged communities and reward those serving
advantaged ones.
In terms of the new floor standards that will also be introduced in 2016 (DfE,
2016c), a school will now be judged underperforming based only on P8. Specifically,
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if its pupils score on average half a grade lower than predicted and if this difference is
statistically significant. The new floor standards therefore contrast starkly with the
existing floor standards, where we have shown that the underperforming status of
schools is overwhelmingly driven by low attainment and that progress (in the form of
EP) only plays a minor role in balancing these judgements. Thus, this move, and the
requirement that schools also be identified as statistically underperforming, should
both prove notable improvements on the current floor standards.
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the evolution of the headline school progress measure
in England from national ‘median-line value-added’ (VA1, 2002–2005) to ‘contex-
tual value-added’ (CVA, 2006–2010) to ‘expected progress’ (EP, 2010–2015) to
‘progress 8’ (P8, 2016–).
Whereas CVA improved on VA1 by attempting to make as fair comparisons
between schools as possible, EP was an explicit ideological shift away from this
whereby the Government declared what it wanted to see—three levels of progress in
all pupils—and held schools accountable accordingly. P8 represents a shift back to a
value-added-based approach in that it once again compares schools to other schools
with similar intakes. However, like EP it will remain blind to all socioeconomic differ-
ences between schools, beyond those implicit in pupils’ prior attainments.
We have critiqued the Government’s justifications for scrapping CVA. First, its
argument that CVA was hard to understand is compromised by similar and more
complex approaches being successfully applied in other schooling systems around the
world. Second, the argument that CVA expected different levels of progress from dif-
ferent pupil groups is strongly questionable. CVA recognised that different pupil
groups domake different progress, and this must be adjusted for in order to make fair
comparisons between schools. That schools may have started to use the published
CVA models to set differential targets for pupils with the same prior attainment, but
different socioeconomic or ethnic status, is a clear misuse of CVA. CVA was not
designed for this purpose, and any misuse in this way illustrates the unintended con-
sequences which frequently arise in high-stakes accountability systems.
We presented four fundamental limitations of EP and illustrated these using the
2014 school league table data. First, EP perversely incentivises schools to concentrate
their efforts on pupils who are borderline in terms of making EP. Second, EP exhibits
an upwards and illogical sawtooth relationship with KS2 score, which severely biases
it in favour of schools with high prior attaining intakes. Third, EP ignores the different
socioeconomic contexts within which schools operate. Fourth, EP makes no attempt
to quantify and communicate statistical uncertainty in measuring school progress.
In terms of our statistical comparison of EP and CVA which used the 2010 school
league table data, we find that the two measures are only moderately positively corre-
lated and so the differences in their construction and interpretation are not just aca-
demic but lead to fundamental changes in how schools are evaluated. Indeed, EP
scores are more strongly correlated with 5 A*–C than with CVA. This suggests that
EP is actually closer to being a pure attainment measure of school performance than a
pure progress measure. This greatly undermines the ‘balancing role’ that EP is
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purported to play in the Government’s ‘floor standards’ (DfE, 2015c). Indeed, we
find that a third of schools judged by the Government to be ‘underperforming’ in
2010 are in the top half of schools nationally in terms of their CVA performance.
Finally, we described how the introduction of P8 in 2016 marks a return to a value-
added-based approach to measuring school progress and in doing so P8, like CVA
before it, will address many of the limitations of EP. However, in contrast to CVA,
the Government will continue to make no adjustments for school differences in
pupils’ socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds when they enter their schools,
and we think this decision is highly problematic given the substantial impact such dif-
ferences make on schools’ rankings.
There are very likely differential impacts of VA1, CVA, EP and P8 on both schools
and their pupils. At the school level those schools with higher prior achieving intakes
are likely to appear particularly successful under EP as it only makes a partial adjust-
ment for prior achievement compared to the other measures. Indeed, we have shown
that grammar schools’ national rankings in 2010 were substantially higher under EP
than under CVA. Schools whose intakes are more socioeconomically advantaged are
likely to benefit from VA1, EP and P8 compared to CVA, as all of these measures
confound this advantage with any true influence of the school. At the pupil level,
pupils identified as being borderline in making EP are likely to have benefitted from
the move from CVA to EP as schools were suddenly incentivised to focus their efforts
on this narrow group. In terms of socioeconomic status, the Government would argue
that disadvantaged pupils would benefit under EP (and VA1 and VA2) as their
schools would now have to aspire for them to achieve higher than under CVA. How-
ever, it could be the case that by judging disadvantaged pupils once again by the same
standards as their more advantaged peers, schools may shift their efforts and
resources away from harder to teach pupil groups.
We conclude that all these progress measures and school league tables more gener-
ally should be viewed with far more scepticism and interpreted far more cautiously
than they have often been to date. Our view is that the CVA measure, and more gen-
erally the multilevel value-added modelling approach which underlies it, has many
advantages over EP and various simpler VA models which have been proposed
—including P8. CVA, by virtue of accounting for the richest set of influences on
student achievement, is also the progress measure most consistent with the main the-
oretical models proposed in the educational effectiveness literature (see Reynolds
et al., 2014 for a recent review). However, a range of well-documented statistical and
more general issues with making quantitative comparisons between schools remain,
whatever the measure employed (Goldstein & Spiegelhalter, 1996). A specific statisti-
cal issue we have not discussed is differential effectiveness—the notion that schools
can have differential effects on different pupil groups—yet this is an important issue
when holding schools to account (Nuttall et al., 1989; Goldstein, 1997; Strand,
2016). It is also an issue which the Government has become increasingly interested
in, as evidenced by its separate reporting of various headlined attainment and
progress measures by pupil subgroups (chiefly with respect to prior attainment and
socioeconomic disadvantage).
A more general concern is the degree to which school league tables, progress or
otherwise, should be used to hold schools accountable at all. The current
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deterministic rule that a school is underperforming if it simultaneously fails floor stan-
dards in 5 A*–C and EP, as well as the revised version of this rule when P8 comes into
effect, appears overly rigid given the high-stake consequences of such judgements.
Many have argued (Willms, 1992; Harris et al., 1995; Goldstein & Spiegelhalter,
1996; Goldstein & Thomas, 1996; Demie, 2003), and we would agree, that school
league tables are best used as tools for school self-evaluation and as a first step
towards identifying successful school policies and practices. Where they are used by
the Government and school inspection systems, they may be better used as monitor-
ing and screening devices to identify schools performing unexpectedly poorly for the
purpose of careful and sensitive further investigation (Foley & Goldstein, 2012). Even
then, school league tables will be of most use when combined with other sources of
school information.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
Section S1. Background on English education system and national testing.
Section S2.CVA.
Figure S1. National percentage of pupils making expected progress during sec-
ondary schooling against KS2 APS in 2014, reported separately for English and
mathematics. The magnitude of the hollow circles is proportional to the national
number of pupils with that KS2 APS. The dashed vertical lines denote the KS2 level
thresholds. Level W = working towards level 1. For clarity, the plot is restricted to val-
ues of KS2 APS for which there were at least 100 pupils nationally.
Figure S2. National mean number of levels of progress during secondary schooling
against KS2 levels in 2014, reported separately for English and mathematics.
Figure S3. National mean number of levels of progress during secondary schooling
against KS2 sub-levels in 2014, reported separately for English and mathematics.
Figure S4. Scatterplot of school CVA ranks against EP ranks, based on 2010 school
league table data, reported separately for English and mathematics. Higher ranks
denote higher performances.
Table S1.Headline attainment and progress measures since 1992.
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